Law and Business Review of the Americas
Volume 1

Number 2

Article 4

1995

Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Disputes: Comparisons
between the NAFTA and the WTO Agreement
F. Amanda DeBusk
Michael A. Meyer

Recommended Citation
F. Amanda DeBusk & Michael A. Meyer, Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Disputes: Comparisons
between the NAFTA and the WTO Agreement, 1 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 31 (1995)
https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra/vol1/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Law and Business Review of the Americas by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more
information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

Antidumping and Countervailing
Duty Disputes:
Comparisons Between the NAFTA and the WTO Agreement

F Amanda DeBusk
MichaelA Meyer'
As the number of antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) investigations has

proliferated, the use of non-judicial dispute resolution as a means to contest the outcome
of these cases also has increased. From a U.S. perspective, the most important of the non-

judicial dispute resolution mechanisms are those provided in the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 2 and the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. 3 This
4
article discusses and compares those mechanisms.
The AD/CVD caseload under NAFTA and the WTO Agreement is likely to be heavy.
The U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 5 dispute resolution mechanism was used
frequently, and the same can be expected of the NAFTA. 6 In anticipation of more cases

1. The authors, attorneys with O'Melveny & Myers, Washington, D.C., were active in the NAFTA
and Uruguay Round negotiations and have served as counsel in numerous U.S.-Canada FTA
and GATT dispute settlement proceedings. They would like to thank Wendy L. Judd and
Thomas B. Stahl for their assistance in preparing this article. The views in this article are those
of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of their clients.
2. The North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Mex.-Can., 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993)
(entered into force January 1, 1994) [hereinafterNAFTA].
3. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
GATT Doc. MTN/FA (April 15, 1994) [hereinafter Final Act], reprinted in Message from the
President of the United States Transmitting the Uruguay Round Trade Agreements, Texts of
Agreements, Implementing Bill, Statement of Administrative Action and Required Supporting
Statements, H.R. Doc. No. 316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) [hereinafterHouse Document].
4. There are many dispute resolution mechanisms found in the NAFTA and WTO Agreement in
addition to those discussed in this article, including NAFTA Chapter 20, 32 LL.M. at 693 (disputes of the parties to the NAFTA); NAFTA Chapter 11, 32 I.L.M. at 639 (investor disputes);
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures [hereinafterSubsidies Agreement],
Final Act at 229, House Document at 1533; WTO Agreement on Preshipment Inspection, Final
Act at 199, House Document at 1506.
5. The U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 12, 1987, U.S.-Can., 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988) [hereinafterU.S.-Can. FTA].
6. Since 1989, forty-nine AD and CVD cases have been challenged under Chapter 19 of the U.S.Canada FTA. Thirty of these panel reviews challenged U.S. determinations, while 19 challenged
Canadian decisions. As of January 6, 1995, 6 cases remained active, the United States won 7
cases, Canada won 7 cases, 12 cases were affirmed in part and remanded in part (generally con-
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under NAFTA, the United States recently expanded the number of roster candidates eligi7
ble to serve as panelists to hear cases.
The number of unfair trade investigations initiated under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has grown, and the trend is likely to continue under the WTO
Agreement, which went into effect on January 1, 1995. During the 1980's, the number of
AD cases initiated by GATT members averaged 140-150 per year.8 From 1990-1993, the
number of AD cases increased to an average of 227 per year.9
The increase in unfair trade investigations over the past several years has led some to
complain that unfair trade remedies have become trade barriers themselves. 10 As a result,
the trading nations of the world have paid closer attention to the negotiation of dispute
settlement mechanisms in international and regional trade agreements. The dispute resolution mechanisms of the NAFTA and the WTO Agreement have built upon and refined
the existing dispute settlement procedures found in Chapter 19 of the U.S.-Canada
FTA, II and the GATT, respectively.12
This article compares the NAFTA and WTO dispute resolution mechanisms for
AD/CVD disputes, focusing on standards of review, procedures for the resolution of
Note 6, continued
sidered a victory for the complainant), 14 cases were terminated and 3 cases were stayed indefinitely. See NAFTA Secretariat, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Status Report of FTA and NAFTA Active
Dispute Settlement Matters (January 1995); NAFTA Secretariat, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Status
Report: Completed NAFTA and FTA Dispute Settlement PanelReviews (January 1995).
7. "U.S. NAFTA Secretariat Expands Roster of Eligible Panelists:' Inside U.S. Trade, Nov. 25, 1994, at 15.
8. General Accounting Office, Pub. No. GAO/NSIAD-90-238FS, Use of the GATTAntidumping Code
at 4 (1990). Between 1980 and 1989, GATT member states initiated 1456 AD cases. Id. Of those
cases, the United States initiated 395, Canada brought 294 and Mexico filed 30. Id.
9. Semi-Annual Reports Under Article 14:4 of the Agreement, GATT ADP/48/Adds. 2-8,
ADP/53/Adds. 2-11, ADP/62/Adds. 2-10, ADP/70/Adds. 2-10, ADP/81/Adds. 2-10,
ADP/88/Adds. 2-12 and ADP/102/Adds. 2-11. During the four-year period from 1990 to 1993,
GATT member states brought 909 AD cases. Of those cases, the United States initiated 216,
Canada initiated 92, and Mexico brought 68. Id. The large number of unfair trade complaints
filed against steel products was a contributing factor to the surge in cases from 1990-1993.
10. See, e.g., Report to the President of the Council of Economic Advisors at 239 (February 1994)
("In the United States and elsewhere, antidumping laws go beyond preventing anticompetitive
practices, which should be their rationale, and often have the effect of protecting domestic
industries from foreign competition."); N. David Palmeter, "The Antidumping Law: A Legal and
Administrative Nontariff Barrier" in Down in the Dumps: Administration of the Unfair Trade
Laws 64, 66 (Boltuck and Litan eds., 1991) ("The standards of the law, the procedure it uses, and
the implementation of these standards and procedures ... increasingly ensure that ...
an exporter
determined to have been selling in the United States below fair value has probably been doing
no such thing in any meaningful sense of the word 'fair.' On the contrary, rather than being a
price discriminator, a dumper is more likely the victim of an antidumping process that has
become a legal and an administrative nontariff barrier"); see also J. Michael Finger, "The Origins
and Evolution of Antidumping Regulation" in Antidumping: How It Works and Who Gets Hurt
13 (J. Michael Finger ed., 1993).
11. Cf NAFTA, Ch. 19,32 I.L.M. at 682, with U.S.-Can. FTA, Ch. 19,27 1.L.M. at 386.
12. Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, GATT BISD 33S/19 (Sept. 20, 1986).
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AD/CVD disputes, and remedies. The NAFTA contains no substantive AD/CVD provisions and replaces domestic judicial review of AD/CVD disputes. In contrast, the WTO
mechanism contains substantive AD/CVD provisions and provides for a determination of
whether AD/CVD decisions are consistent with those substantive provisions.
The NAFTA and WTO Agreement have many similar AD/CVD dispute settlement procedures, including the process for panel selection, tight deadlines and a means for challenging panel decisions. However, these mechanisms differ significantly in that NAFTA Chapter
19 provides a legal, adjudicative process that allows for full participation by non-governmental parties and open proceedings while the WTO Agreement emphasizes governmentto-government conciliation, with a very limited role for non-government parties in generally closed proceedings, although the United States is pushing for greater transparency.
AD/CVD remedies available under the NAFTA and WTO Agreement can vary. Under
NAFTA, a winning exporter can obtain automatic revocation of the order and a refund of
all duties. 13 Under the WTO Agreement, the remedy is to bring a country's AD/CVD law
into compliance with the relevant WTO provision, and failing that, compensation or suspension of WTO benefits.

L Standards of Review Under the NAFTA and the WTO Agreement
The first question facing a party seeking the review of an AD or CVD determination
is the proper forum for review. The NAFTA and the WTO Agreement provide dispute
settlement for different issues. While Chapter 19 of the NAFTA essentially replaces
domestic judicial review, 14 the WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes provides for the determination of whether an AD or CVD
determination complies with the standards for such determinations set forth in the
WTO Agreement.15In certain cases, a particular decision may be challenged under both
mechanisms.16

13. See, e.g., Certain Softwood Lumber Products From Canada, 59 Fed. Reg. 42029 (Dep't Comm.
1994) (notice of panel decision); "U.S., Canada Announce New Talks After Repayment of
Duties' Inside U.S. Trade, Dec. 16, 1994, at 1.
14. NAFTA, Art. 1904.1, 32 I.L.M. at 683.
15. The WTO Agreement dispute settlement procedures are designed to provide the "prompt settlement of situations in which a Member considers that any benefits accruing to it directly or indirectly under the covered agreements are being impaired by measures taken by another Member."
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes [hereinafter
Annex 2],Art. 3.3, Final Act at 354, House Document at 1655.
16. To date, two cases have been appealed under both the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement and the
GATT. See In the Matter of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Porkftom Canada, USA-89-1904-06 (U.S.Canada Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel Review September 28, 1990); Countervailing
Duties on Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork from Canada, GATT BISD 38S/30 (July 11, 1991); In
the Matter of Certain Softwood Lumber Productsfrom Canada, USA-92-1901-01 (U.S.-Canada
Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel Review May 6, 1993); United States - Measures Affecting
Imports of Softwood Lumber from Canada, GATT Doc. SCM/162 (February 19, 1993).
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A.

NAFFA REPLACES DOMEsTIC JUDICIAL REVIEW
Article 1904 of the NAFTA creates a dispute settlement mechanism that replaces the
domestic judicial review proceedings of each member country. 17 Like the U.S.-Canada
FTA, NAFTA does not contain substantive provisions governing AD and CVD determinations. 18 As a result, NAFTA Chapter 19 panels may only determine whether a final AD or
CVD decision is "in accordance with the antidumping or countervailing duty law of the
importing Party" 19 For purposes of Chapter 19 panel review,
the antidumping or countervailing duty law consists of the relevant
statutes, legislative history, regulations, administrative practice and
judicial precedents to the extent that a court of the importing Party
would rely on such materials in reviewing a final determination of the
20
competent investigating authority.
AD and CVD appeals normally challenge evidentiary matters and interpretations of law,
so NAFTA dispute settlement would be an appropriate forum when, for example, the
complainant questions whether there is sufficient evidence on the record to support a
21
finding that a petitioner has standing.
NAFTA requires that panelists apply the standard of judicial review of the country
that issued the final determination. 22 In the United States, the standard of review for AD

17. NAFTA, Art. 1904.1, 32 I.L.M. at 683.
18. Id. During both the U.S.-Canada FTA and NAFTA negotiations, the United States refused to
include substantive provisions that would amend U.S. AD and CVD determinations. See
"Mexican Proposal to Debate Reforms of Trade Laws Hits U.S. Brick Wall," Inside U.S. Trade,
July 12, 1991, at 1.
19. NAFTA, Art. 1904.2, 32 I.L.M. at 683.
20. Id. Since the United States and Canada have predominantly common law systems and Mexico
has a civil law system, panelists may be called upon to judge a decision based on a system with
which they are unfamiliar.
21. A WTO panel also could rule on evidentiary matters. In a GATT panel ruling on plastic from the
United States, a lack of evidence in the administrative opinion was construed as a lack of positive
evidence as required by Article 3:3 of the Antidumping Code. Korea - Antidumping Duties on
Imports of Polyacetal Resins from the U.S., at para. 287, GATT Doc. ADP/72 (Apr. 2, 1993) ("the
determination did not include an examination, let alone evidence, of the future evolution of the
volume of imports and price effects of these imports"). See also U.S. - Imposition of
CountervailingDuties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating
in France,Germany and the UnitedKingdom, at para. 429, GATT Doc. DRS/la (1994) (finding of
a pass through of subsidies not a sufficient basis to support a finding that a subsidy was bestowed
on the production of merchandise); id. at para. 476 (agency failed to adequately explain
unequityworthiness finding); id. at para. 550 (agency failed to provide adequate explanation for
finding that a company was not creditworthy); id. at para. 580 (agency failed to provide sufficient
explanation for relying on "'the facts available"' for calculation of the discount rate).
22. NAFTA, Art. 1904.3, 32 I.L.M. at 683. See also id. at Article 1911, 32 I.L.M. at 687; id. at Annex

1911, 32 I.L.M. at 691-93.

Spring 1995

35

and CVD final determinations 23 is whether the determination is "unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise [is] not in accordance with law"' 24 For decisions not to initiate an investigation, not to review a determination based upon changed
circumstances, or a negative preliminary determination by the U.S. International Trade
Commission, the standard is whether the decision is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.''25
The applicable standard of review in Canada 26 is whether the agency
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

acted without jurisdiction, acted beyond its jurisdiction or refused to
exercise its jurisdiction;
failed to observe a principle of natural justice, procedural fairness or
other procedure that it was required by law to observe;
erred in law in making a decision or order, whether or not the error
appears on the face of the record;
based its decision on an erroneous finding of fact that was made in a
perverse or capricious manner or without regard to the material before
it;

(e)

acted or failed to act, by reason of fraud or perjured evidence; or acted
27
in any other way that was contrary to law.

The Mexican standard of review 28 provides that an AD or CVD determination will
be declared illegal if one of the following causes is shown:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

lack of competence of the administrator who issued the decision or
conducted the proceedings;
omission of formal legal requirements, including the absence of a foundation or causation;
procedural defects in the proceeding;
incorrect or misunderstood facts, or improper issuance or enforcement
of the decisions;
an exercise of discretionary authority inconsistent with the objectives of
29
the law granting the authority.

23. NAFTA, Annex 1911, 32 I.L.M. at 693 (definition of standard of review for the United States).
24. Tariff Act of 1930 § 516A(b)(1)(B), as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(1988).
25. Tariff Act of 1930 § 516A(b)(1)(A), as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(A)(1988).
26. NAFTA, Annex 1911, 32 I.L.M. at 693 (definition of standard of review in Canada).
27. Federal Court Act, R.S.C., ch. F-7, § 18.1(4) (1985) (Can.).
28. NAFTA, Annex 1911, 32 I.L.M. at 693 (definition of Mexican standard of review).
29. C6digo Fiscalde la Federaci6n,Article 238, December 31, 1981.
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The U.S., Canadian and Mexican standards of review are deferential to the administering authorities' determinations in varying degrees, 30 and panels are expected to pro31
vide the same degree of deference as the local court.
B.

WTO PANELS DETERMINE WHETHER AD/CVD DECISIONS ARE CONSISTENT WrrH THE
WTO AGREEMENT
The dispute settlement provisions of the WTO Agreement are found primarily in the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. 32 These
provisions build upon and strengthen the dispute settlement provisions found in
Chapters XXII and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the Under33
standing Regarding Notification, Consultations, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance.
In addition, for AD, there is an overlay of special rules as indicated in Appendix 2 of
34
Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement.
30. See, e.g., Calabrian Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm., 794 F. Supp. 377, 381 (Ct. Int'l Trade) ("As to
the burden of proof, the statute provides that 'the decision of ... the [agency] is presumed to be
correct. The burden of proving otherwise shall rest upon the party challenging such decision."'
(quoting 28 U.S.C. §-2639(a)(1) (1988)));
In American Farm Bureau Federation v. Canadian Import Tribunal,2 S.C.R. 1324 (1990)
(Can.), the Canadian Supreme Court upheld a decision of the Canadian Import Tribunal, stating that it would not interfere if there was "any evidence" on which the Tribunal's judgment
could be based. A GATT panel rejected this standard of extreme deference to the Canadian
Import Tribunal. See Canadian CountervailingDuties on Grain Corn from the United States, at
para. 6.1, GATT Doc. SCM/140 (Feb. 21, 1992) ("The Panel concludes that the determination of
injury by the CIT ... is not consistent with the requirements of Article 6 ... because the CIT did
not determine [injury] on the basis of positive evidence").
31. Whether an FTA panel applied the appropriate standard of review was hotly contested in the
matter of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork From Canada,ECC-91-1904-OIUSA (U.S.-Canada FTA
Extraordinary Challenge Committee Proceeding June 14, 1991). In that case, the United States
filed an extraordinary challenge on the grounds, inter alia, that the panel "manifestly exceeded
its powers, authority or jurisdiction" by applying an inappropriate standard of review. Id. at 14.
The extraordinary challenge committee rejected the United States' argument. Because of the
controversy surrounding this case, the United States insisted on adding language to the NAFTA
explicitly clarifying that failure to apply the appropriate standard of review is an example of how
a panel can manifestly exceed its powers, authority or jurisdiction. Cf. NAFTA, Art.
1904.13(a)(iii), 32 I.L.M. at 683 with U.S.-Can. FTA, Art. 1904.13(a)(iii), 27 I.L.M. at 388-89.
32. Annex 2, Final Act at 353, House Document at 1654.
33. Cf. id. with GATT Chapters XXII and XXIII, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. (pt. 5) A3, A64-65, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, 266-68, and with Understanding Regarding
Notification, Consultations, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance, GATT BISD 26S/210
(November 28, 1979). The Ministerial Declaration launching the Uruguay Round confirms the
Parties' desire to strengthen GATT dispute settlement. See Ministerial Declaration on the
Uruguay Round, GATT BISD 33S at 25 ("negotiations shall aim to improve and strengthen the
rules and the procedures of the dispute settlement process").
34. Annex 2, Appendix 2, Final Act at 374, House Document at 1675. See also Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 [hereinafter
AD Agreement], Arts. 17.4-17.7, Final Act at 374, House Document at 1675; Subsidies Agree-
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Unlike the NAFTA, the WTO Agreement provides detailed substantive provisions
governing the imposition of antidumping and countervailing duties. 35 Accordingly, dispute resolution under the WTO Agreement will involve a determination of whether the
underlying AD or CVD decision was issued in compliance with the appropriate substantive and procedural requirements.
Because the Subsidies Agreement contains no special or additional rules governing
the settlement of disputes involving CVD determinations, the standards of review found
in Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement apply.36 The standards of review set forth in Annex 2
are fairly broad. All dispute resolution mechanisms found in Annex 2 are governed by the
general principle that WTO dispute settlement "serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of
those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law."37 In addition, a panel convened under the WTO Agreement's general dispute
settlement provisions is charged with "mak[ing] an objective assessment of the matter
before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of
and conformity with the relevant covered agreements ... "'38 Because the WTO Agreement's standard of review is less deferential than the standard for NAFTA panels, WTO
dispute resolution may be more appealing than NAFTA to a party seeking to overturn a
CVD order. However, the WTO Agreement's vague standard of review also may create
uncertainty as to the outcome of the proceedings.
By contrast, the Antidumping Agreement does contain special rules governing the
Note 34, continued
ment, Arts. 4.2-4.12, Final Act at 231-32, House Document at 1535-36, Art. 6.6, Final Act at 23435, House Document at 1538-39, Arts. 7.2-7.10, Final Act at 235-37, House Document at 153941, Art. 8.5, Final Act at 239-40, House Document at 1543-44, n.35, Final Act at 241, House
Document at 1545, Art. 24.4, Final Act at 255, House Document at 1559, Art. 27.7, Final Act at
258, House Document at 1562, and Annex V, Final Act at 269-70, House Document at 1573-74.
None of the additional provisions found in the Subsidies Agreement applies to disputes
involving CVD determinations. The WTO Ministerial Declaration on Dispute Settlement
Pursuant to the Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994 or Part V of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
recognizes "the need for consistent resolution of disputes arising from antidumping and countervailing duty measures," but does not require the application of identical rules. See Final Act at
403, House Document at 1696.
35. See AD Agreement, Final Act at 145, House Document at 1453; Subsidies Agreement, Final Act
at 229, House Document at 1533.
36. See Subsidies Agreement, Art. 30, Final Act at 260, House Document at 1564 ("The provisions of
Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as elaborated and applied by the Dispute Settlement
Understanding shall apply to consultations and the settlement of disputes under this Agreement,
except as otherwise specifically provided herein"); Annex 2, Art. 1.1, Final Act at 353, House
Document at 1654 ("The rules and procedures of this Understanding shall apply to disputes
brought pursuant to the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the agreements listed
in Appendix 1 to this Understanding"). As noted supra at note 35, a Ministerial Declaration recognizes the need for consistent resolution of AD and CVD disputes.
37. Annex 2, Art. 3.2, Final Act at 354, House Document at 1655.
38. Id. at Art. 11, Final Act at 360, House Document at 1661.
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settlement of disputes involving AD cases. 39 Among these special rules are two provisions
on standards for panel reviews of antidumping matters that supplement the standards set
forth in Annex 2. With respect to issues of fact, Article 17.6 of the Antidumping Agreement provides that
in its assessment of the facts of the matter, the panel shall determine
whether the authorities' establishment of the facts was proper and
whether their evaluation of those facts was unbiased and objective. If
the establishment of the facts was proper and the evaluation was unbiased and objective, even though the panel might have reached a differ40
ent conclusion, the evaluation shall not be overturned.
For issues involving the interpretation of the Antidumping Agreement, Article 17.6 states
that
the panel shall interpret the relevant provisions of the Agreement in
accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Where the panel finds that a relevant provision of the
Agreement admits of more than one permissible interpretation, the
panel shall find the authorities' measure to be in conformity with the
41
Agreement if it rests upon one of those permissible interpretations.
The additional language on standards of review set forth in the Antidumping Agreement can be traced to a last minute proposal submitted by the United States. 42 The United
39. AD Agreement, Arts. 17.3-17.7, Final Act at 164-65, House Document at 1472-73.
40. Id. at Art. 17.6(i), Final Act at 165, House Document at 1473.
41. Id. at Art. 17.6(ii), Final Act at 165, House Document at 1473.
42. Proposals to Amend the Draft Antidumping Agreement (Nov. 26, 1993). The Uruguay Round
negotiations were concluded less than one month later on December 15, 1993.
The language proposed by the United States follows:
In examining the matter referred to in paragraph 4, the panel:
(i) in its objective assessment of the facts of the matter, shall not reweigh the facts
made available to the domestic authorities, but instead shall determine whether
the authorities' evaluation of those facts was reasonable; and
(ii) in its objective assessment of the applicability of the Agreement to a measure
and the conformity of that measure with the Agreement, shall determine and
interpret the relevant provisions of the Agreement. Where a panel finds that a
relevant provision of the Agreement is ambiguous or does not specify how the
obligation under that provision is to be performed, the panel shall determine
whether the authorities' action is outside the range of actions consistent with
that obligation.
Id. Although the United States sought parallel changes in the Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures text, see id., no such standard appears in the Subsidies Agreement. See Subsidies
Agreement, Art. 30, Final Act at 260, House Document at 1564.
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States reportedly was concerned that WTO panels would examine AD and CVD cases de
novo, without giving proper deference to administering authorities. The greater deference
found in the U.S. proposal is similar to the deferential review accorded to AD and CVD
determinations by the United States Court of International Trade and therefore would have
been similar to the standard applied by NAFTA panels reviewing U.S. determinations. 4 3
However, the language of the Final Act differs from that of the U.S. proposal. 4
In sum, in analyzing the standards of review under NAFTA and the WTO Agreement, a party should bear in mind that under the NAFTA, the relevant question is
whether the authority's decision is supportable under the domestic standard of review as
it would be interpreted by a local court, whereas under the WTO Agreement, the relevant
question is whether the authority's decision is consistent with the WTO Agreement under
the less deferential WTO standard of review.

II. Procedures for NAFTA and WTO Agreement Dispute Settlement
NAFTA Chapter 19 dispute resolution resembles appellate court proceedings, whereas the WTO Agreement provides a structure that strives for a mutual settlement between
the parties in dispute. In many respects, the WTO Agreement structure is more like
NAFTA Chapter 20, which governs disputes of the NAFTA countries, than the AD/CVD
dispute resolution procedures of NAFTA Chapter 19.

A.

NAFA PROVIDES FOR ADJUDICATIVE PRocEDuREs wrrI ARBITRAL PANELS, TIGHT
DEADLINEs AND THE OPPoRruNITY FOR APPEAL

1.

Initiationof Dispute Settlement Proceedings
NAFTA Chapter 19 dispute settlement begins with a written request for panel review
submitted within 30 days of the date of publication of the decision in question. 45 A
43. See, e.g., American Spring Wire Corp. v. U.S., 590 F. Supp. 1273, 1276 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984)
("[t]he court may not substitute its judgment for that of the [agency] when the choice is
'between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo ..:" (quoting Penntech Papers,Inc. v. NLRB,
706 F.2d 18,22 (1st Cir. 1983))).
44. For instance, concerning the facts, the U.S. language prohibiting the reweighing of facts was
changed to language calling for a determination of whether the establishment of the facts was
proper and the evaluation of the facts unbiased and objective; U.S. language calling for a determination of whether the facts were reasonable was changed to call for a determination of
whether the evaluation of the facts was unbiased and objective even though the panel would
have reached a different conclusion.
As for challenges to the interpretation of the Antidumping Agreement, the U.S. language
stated that if a provision was ambiguous or did not specify how an obligation was to be performed, the panel would determine whether the authority's action was outside the range of
actions consistent with the obligation whereas the language of the Antidumping Agreement calls
for an interpretation in accordance with the customary rules of interpretation of public international law and specifies that if more than one interpretation is permissible, the authority's measure is in conformance as long as it rests upon one of the permissible interpretations.
45. NAFTA, Art. 1904.4, 32 I.L.M. at 683.
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request for panel review may be made by a party to the NAFTA (the U.S., Canada or
Mexico) or "on request of a person who would otherwise be entitled under the law of the
importing Party to commence domestic procedures for judicial review of that final determination' 46 The administering authority that issued the decision in question and any
persons who could participate in domestic judicial review proceedings have the right to
appear and be represented by counsel before the panel. 47 The rules of procedure for
48
Chapter 19 panel review are based upon judicial rules of appellate procedure
and close49
Trade.
International
of
Court
States
United
the
of
ly resemble the rules
2.

Panel Selection

NAFTA panels consist of 5 persons selected from a roster. 50 The roster must contain at
least 75 candidates, at least 25 provided by each party, and "shall include judges or former
judges to the fullest extent practicable. " 5 1 Candidates must be citizens of Canada, Mexico or
52
the United States and may not be affiliated with or take instructions from a party.
46. Id. at Art. 1904.5, 32 I.L.M. at 683.
47. Id. at Art. 1904.7, 32 I.L.M. at 683. NAFTXs provision for the appearance of any interested party

before the panel creates a substantial benefit over WTO dispute settlement. As explained below,
only members to the WTO Agreement (governmental representatives) participate in WTO dispute settlement, although private parties can have input through their governments.
48. Id. at Art. 1904.14, 32 I.L.M. at 684.
49. The NAFTA Chapter 19 panel rules cover:
the content and service of requests for panels; a requirement that the competent investigating authority transmit to the panel the administrative record of
the proceeding; the protection of business proprietary, government classified,
and other privileged information (including sanctions against persons partici-

pating before panels for improper release of such information); participation
by private persons; limitations on panel review to errors alleged by the NAFTA
member countries or private persons; filing and service of documents; computation and extensions of time; the form and content of briefs and other papers;
pre- and post-hearing conferences; motions; oral argument; requests for
rehearing; and voluntary terminations of panel reviews.
NAFTA Art. 1904.14, 32 I.L.M. at 684. Cf.id. with U.S. Court of International Trade Rules.
50. NAFTA, Annex 1901.2 (1), 32 I.L.M. at 687. "Candidates shall be of good character, high standing and repute, and shall be chosen strictly on the basis of objectivity, reliability, sound judgment and general familiarity with international trade law." Id.
51. Id. The same preference for judges or former judges as panelists does not appear in the U.S.Canada Free Trade Agreement. See U.S.-Can. FTA, Annex 1901.2 (1), 27 I.L.M. at 393. The preference for judges reportedly derives from a U.S. concern that panelists who are practitioners
rather than judges would conduct a more probing review than the deferential standard provided
in U.S. law. (The U.S. has so far been unable to find any judge to serve on an FTA panel.) The
NAFTA also requires that the majority of panelists be lawyers and that the chairman of the panel
be appointed from among the lawyers. NAFTA, Annex 1901.2 (2) and (3), 32 I.L.M. at 687.
Again, the preference for lawyers reflects the fact that the NAFTA binational panel system is
designed to replace judicial review. Lawyers apparently are perceived to be more qualified to render decisions as a domestic court would render a decision.
52. NAFTA, Annex 1901.2 (1), 32 I.L.M. at 687.
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In general, panelists are selected for a particular case within 60 days of the request for
panel review. 53 Each party involved must appoint two panelists, normally from the
roster, 54 and may exercise four confidential peremptory challenges to panelists proposed
by the other party. 55 By the 55th day after the request for panel review, the parties
involved must agree on the fifth panelist. 56 If a party fails to appoint a panelist or if the
57
parties fail to agree on the fifth panelist, that panelist will be selected by lot.
3.

Deadlinesfor PanelReview

One of the most beneficial aspects of NAFTA dispute settlement is the fixed time
period for panel review. Under Chapter 19, final panel decisions must be issued within
315 days of the date on which a request for a panel is made. 58 This period includes the
following time allowances:
(a) 30 days for the filing of the complaint;
(b) 30 days for designation or certification of the administrative record and its
filing with the panel;
(c) 60 days for the complainant to file its brief;
(d) 60 days for the respondent to file its brief;
(e) 15 days for the filing of reply briefs;
(f) 15 to 30 days for the panel to convene and hear oral argument; and
(g) 90 days for the panel to issue its written decision. 59
60
Under the U.S.-Canada FTA, panels almost always met their deadlines for review.
NAFTA panels are expected to have the same efficient record.

4.

Challenges to PanelDecisions

A NAFTA country 6 ' may challenge a panel decision through an Extraordinary
Challenge Committee (ECC) 62 based on an allegation that:
53. Id. at Annex 1901.2 (2) and (3), 32 I.L.M. at 687.
54. 1& at Annex 1901.2 (2), 32 I.L.M. at 687.
55. Id.

56. Id. at Annex 1901.2 (3), 32 I.L.M. at 687.
57. Id. at Annex 1901.2 (2) and (3), 32 I.L.M. at 687.
58. Id. at Art. 1904.14, 32 I.L.M. at 684.
59. Id.

60. Horlick and DeBusk, Dispute Resolution under NAFTA: Building on the U.S.-Canada FTA, GATT
and ICSID, 27 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE 21, 29 (Feb. 1993).
61. Interested parties other than the governments of the United States, Canada and Mexico may not
request Extraordinary Challenge Committee review. NAFTA, Art. 1904.13, 32 I.L.M. at 683.
62. Under the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement, three Extraordinary Challenge Committees were
convened. See Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork from Canada,ECC-91-1904-O1USA (U.S.-Canada
FTA Extraordinary Challenge Committee Proceeding June 14, 1991); Live Swine from Canada,
ECC-93-1904-OIUSA (U.S.-Canada FTA Extraordinary Challenge Committee Proceeding April
8, 1993); Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada,ECC-94-1904-0LUSA (U.S.-Canada
FTA Extraordinary Challenge Committee Proceeding Aug. 3, 1994). Each of these challenges was
initiated by the United States and each ECC upheld the underlying panel decision.
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a member of the panel was guilty of gross misconduct, bias, or a serious
conflict of interest, or otherwise materially violated the rules of conduct,
(ii) the panel seriously departed from a fundamental rule of procedure, or
(iii) the panel manifestly exceeded its powers, authority or jurisdiction set out in
this Article, for example by failing to apply the appropriate standard of
review, and
(b) any of the actions set out in subparagraph (a) has materially affected the
panel's decision and threatens the integrity of the binational panel
63
review process.
(a) (i)

64
ECCs are comprised of 3 judges or former judges selected from a 15 person roster.
The parties involved in the dispute must establish the ECC within 15 days of the request
for the review, 65 and ECC proceedings must be completed within 90 days of the establish66
ment of the Committee.

B.

THE WTO AGREEMENT STRIVES FOR MUTUAL SETTLEMENTS OF DISPUTEs, wrrH PANELS
TO BE CONVENED IF CONSUMTATION OR MEDATION FAILS

Dispute settlement under the WTO Agreement consists of several levels. Article 2 of
Annex 2 creates the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) as the committee charged with
67
administering the rules provided in the Understanding on Dispute Settlement. The
DSB is authorized "to establish panels, adopt panel and Appellate Body reports, maintain
suspensurveillance of implementation of rulings and recommendations, and authorize
68
sion of concessions and other obligations under the covered agreements'
I.

Initiationof Dispute Settlement Proceedings

Unlike NAFTA, only representatives of member countries initiate and participate in
the WTO Agreement dispute settlement process. Thus, in order for an interested party
(such as a company) in the underlying dispute to pursue WTO dispute settlement, that
party must convince its government to commence WTO proceedings on its behalf. This
obstacle raises several concerns for the affected party: first, a government may be unwilling to pursue WTO dispute settlement if its domestic law also is inconsistent with the
WTO Agreement; second, a government may be unwilling to enter into WTO dispute settlement for political reasons unrelated to the case in dispute; third, the interested party is
likely to have difficulty controlling and monitoring the proceedings since the proceedings
have been closed to non-government representatives; and fourth, the government may
63. NAFTA, Art. 1904.13, 32 I.L.M. at 683. See supra note 32. NAFTA clarified that failure to apply
the appropriate standard of review is an example of how a panel could manifestly exceed its
powers, authority or jurisdiction.
64. NAFTA, Annex 1904.13 (1), 32 I.L.M. at 688. "Each Party shall name five persons to this Roster.
Each involved Party shall select one member from this roster and the involved Parties shall
decide by lot which of them shall select the third member from the roster." Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at Annex 1904.13 (2), 32 I.L.M. at 688. The U.S.-Canada FTA provides only 30 days for EGG
review. U.S.-Can. FTA, Annex 1904.13(2), 27 I.L.M. at 395.
67. Annex 2, Art. 2.1, Final Act at 353, House Document at 1654.
68. Id.

Spring 1995

43

enter into a settlement that does not benefit the interested party.
2.

Consultation
The first layer of dispute settlement under the WTO Agreement is consultation
whereby parties to the dispute discuss a mutual settlement of the complaint. Article 4.2 of
Annex 2 provides that
[e]ach Member undertakes to accord sympathetic consideration to and
afford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding any representations made by another Member concerning measures affecting the
operation of any covered agreement taken within the territory of the
69
former.
Upon receipt of a written request for consultations, the WTO member to which the
request is made must reply to the request within 10 days of receipt and enter into consultations within thirty days of receipt of the request. 70 If a member fails to respond to the
request for consultations, or if consultations fail to resolve the dispute within 60 days of
71
receipt of the request, the complaining party may request the establishment of a panel.
The complaining member may request a panel review prior to the expiration of the 60
72
day period if the parties to the dispute agree that the consultations have failed.
3.

Establishment of a Panel
The next phase in the WTO Agreement dispute settlement process is the establishment of a panel. Panels are charged with assisting the DSB in making recommendations
or issuing rulings. 73 Panel review is confidential, and interested parties may only appear
before the panel when invited to do so. 74 While the confidential nature of panel review
may encourage a negotiated settlement of the dispute, which is the preferred means of
69. Id. at Art. 4.2, Final Act at 356, House Document at 1657.
70. Id. at Art. 4.3, Final Act at 356, House Document at 1657.
71. Id. at Arts. 4.3, 4.7, Final Act at 356, House Document at 1657. "In cases of urgency, including

those which concern perishable goods, Members shall enter into consultations within a period
of no more than 10 days after the date of receipt of the request. If the consultations have failed
to settle the dispute within a period of 20 days after the date of receipt of the request, the complaining party may request the establishment of a panel.' Id. at Art. 8, Final Act at 358-59, House

Document at 1659-60.
72. Id. at Art. 4.7, Final Act at 356, House Document at 1657. During consultations, WTO members
may resort to good offices, conciliation or mediation as an alternate means of resolving the dispute. Id. at Art. 5, Final Act at 357, House Document at 1658. Good offices, conciliation and
mediation are voluntary and may be terminated without prejudice to the rights of any party to
pursue further proceedings. Id. at Arts. 5.1, 5.2, Final Act at 357, House Document at 1658.
Good offices, conciliation and mediation may continue after panel proceedings have begun. Id.
at Art. 5.5, Final Act at 357, House Document at 1658.
73. Id. at Art. 11, Final Act at 360, House Document at 1661.
74. Id. at Appendix 3, Final Act at 375, House Document at 1676.
75. Id. at Art. 3.7, Final Act at 354-55, House Document at 1655-56 ("A solution mutually acceptable to the parties to the dispute ... is clearly to be preferred").
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dispute settlement under the WTO, 7 5 this lack of transparency has raised concerns about
the legitimacy of a system that restricts public scrutiny of the proceedings. The United
States is pressuring other members of the WTO to make WTO dispute resolution more
transparent. 76 By contrast, NAFTA Chapter 19 provides for a higher degree of trans77
parency by allowing, for example, public access to the non-proprietary case files.
4.

PanelSelection

To facilitate the panel selection process, the Secretariat is directed to maintain an
"indicative list" of qualified individuals. 78 This list includes the roster created under the
GATT as well as names periodically provided by members. 79 Upon the establishment of a
panel, the Secretariat will propose nominations for the panel to the members in dispute,
and members may only object to a panelist "for compelling reasons' 80 If the members can76. See "U.S. Calls for New GATT Rules to Make Public Most Documents," Inside U.S. Trade, Oct. 7,
1994, at 13; see also "U.S. Proposal to Boost GATT Transparency Garners No Support In GATT,"
Inside U.S. Trade, Sept. 23, 1994, at 17.
The U.S. effort to create greater transparency in the WTO dispute resolution process is to
some extent an outgrowth of litigation. In October 1994, the Center for Auto Safety filed suit in
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia seeking public access to panel submissions
by GATT members. See Center For Auto Safety v. USTR, No. 94-2238 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 17,
1994). See also Citizen Groups File New Suits Against USTR, 11 INT'L TRADE REP (BNA) 1619
(1994). In a similar suit filed in 1992, the same court determined that unadopted GATT panel
reports, which up to that time had been confidential, must be disclosed under the Freedom of
Information Act unless covered by a statutory exemption. See Public Citizen v. USTR, 804 F.
Supp. 385 (D.D.C. 1992).
U.S. legislation implementing the WTO Agreement provides that documents submitted
to a panel or appellate body shall be made available to the public promptly except for proprietary or confidential information. The Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465,
sec. 127(c), 108 Stat. 4809 (1994).
77. North American Free Trade Agreement: Rules of Procedure for Article 1904 Binational Panel
Review, Rule 16(2)(a), 59 Fed. Reg. 8686, 8689 (Dep't Comm. 1994) [hereinafterNAFTA Panel
Rules].
78. Annex 2, Art. 8.4, Final Act at 359, House Document at 1660. The qualifications for panelists
under the WTO Agreement dispute settlement procedures are as follows:
Panels shall be composed of well-qualified governmental and/or non-governmental individuals, including persons who have served on or presented a case to a panel, served as a representative of a Member or of a contracting party to GATT 1947 or as representative to the
Council or Committee of any covered agreement or its predecessor agreement, or in the
Secretariat, taught or published on international trade law or policy, or served as a senior
trade policy official of a Member.
Id. at Art. 8.1, Final Act at 358, House Document at 1659.
791d. at Art. 8.4, Final Act at 359, House Document at 1660. See also Dispute Settlement Procedures,
GATT BISD 3 1S/9 (Nov. 30, 1984).
80. Annex 2, Art. 8.6, Final Act at 359, House Document at 1660.
81. Id. at Art. 8.7, Final Act at 359, House Document at 1660. Under the GATT, panelists typically
were chosen by mutual agreement of the members involved in the dispute rather than from the
roster.
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not agree on the panelists within 20 days of the establishment of the panel, the DirectorGeneral will appoint the panelists after consultations with the members involved. 81
In contrast with the NAFTA, WTO panelists may not be citizens of members whose
governments are parties to the dispute, unless the parties agree. 82 Although this provision
most likely was added to ensure the impartiality of panel decisions, the experience under
the U.S.-Canada FTA generally demonstrates that panels comprised of nationals of the
83
parties in dispute can render impartial decisions.
Finally, unlike NAFTA Chapter 19, which creates a preference for lawyers as panelists,
the WTO Agreement has no preference for lawyers. 84 Annex 2 has language calling for
diversity among panel members: "[p]anel members should be selected with a view to
ensuring the independence of the members, a sufficiently diverse background and a wide
spectrum of experience' 85 However, that goal is significantly qualified by Article 8.186
favoring candidates with experience in international trade law or policy, previous GATT
panels, or the WTO or predecessor agreements. 87 Again, since NAFTA dispute settlement
replaces judicial review, the preference for judges and lawyers seems logical; however,
since the WTO Agreement calls for an examination of the rights and obligations of the
members, experience with the WTO Agreement, previous panels or predecessor agreements seem to be appropriate qualifications.
5.

Deadlinesfor Panel Review

The panel review portion of the WTO Agreement dispute settlement process generally should not exceed 6 months but in no case may it exceed 9 months.88 The general
working procedures for panels provides for written submissions by the WTO members,
rebuttal submissions, and panel meetings with the WTO members. 89 Of particular note,
the panel process includes two interim review periods whereby the WTO members can
(1) review and comment on the factual and argument portions of the panel report, and
(2) review the panel's findings and conclusions and request that the panel reconsider its
findings and conclusions before issuing its final report. 90
82. Id. at Art. 8.3, Final Act at 358, House Document at 1659.
83. Twenty-six panel reviews have been completed under Chapter 19 of the U.S.-Canada FTA. Of
those, eighteen decisions were unanimous. Of the three ECC decisions which have been rendered, two were unanimous. See NAFTA Secretariat, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Status Report:
Completed NAFTA and FTA Dispute Settlement PanelReviews (January 1995).
84. In this respect, the WTO is similar to NAFTA Chapter 20, which also has no preference for
lawyers as panelists. NAFTA, Art. 2009,32 I.L.M. at 695-96.
85. Annex 2, Art. 8.2, Final Act at 358, House Document at 1659.
86. See supra note 79.
87. At present, there are reportedly no women on the GATT roster. In practice, most GATT panelists have been ex-GATT diplomats or officials. The WTO Agreement's objective of selecting
panelists with diverse backgrounds and a wide spectrum of experience could promote public
acceptance of WTO panel decisions.
88. Annex 2, Art. 12.8, 12.9, Final Act at 361, House Document at 1662. In cases of urgency, the
panel should issue its final ruling within 3 months of the establishment of the panel.
89. Id. at Appendix 3.12, Final Act at 376, House Document at 1677.
90. Id. at Arts. 15.1, 15.2, Final Act at 363, House Document at 1664. Cf with NAFTA, Arts. 2016.22016.3,32 I.L.M. at 697.
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The interim review process marks an interesting difference between WTO and
NAFTA dispute settlement. WTO dispute settlement aims for the mutual settlement of
the dispute at every level of the dispute settlement process. 9 1 The interim review period
provides the last opportunity to settle the dispute before a final report is circulated
among the members. Under NAFTA, although the parties to the dispute may terminate
the review prior to conclusion, they do not have the opportunity to do so after having
92
seen the panel's determination.
6.

PanelAppeals

If the parties fail to reach a mutual settlement following this interim stage, the panel will
issue its final report to the DSB. 93 Final panel decisions are circulated among the members
of the WTO,94 and the report will be adopted "unless a party to the dispute formally notifies
95
the DSB of its decision to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report."
Panel decisions may be appealed to the Appellate Body (AB). 9 6 The AB consists of
seven people, each of whom serves a four year term, and three members of the AB serve
on each case. 97 AB proceedings generally shall not exceed 60 days, but in no case shall
98
they exceed 90 days from the date that a party notifies the DSB of its intent to appeal.
Appeals to the AB are "limited to issues of law covered in the panel report and legal
interpretations developed by the panel' 99 and the AB may uphold, modify or reverse the
legal findings and conclusions of the panel. 100 Like panel determinations, AB decisions
will be adopted unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the AB report. 101
The maximum time period for WTO dispute settlement from the request for consultations to the DSB meeting at which a panel report will be considered is 11 months if the panel
report is not appealed, 102 or 14 months if the panel report is appealed. 103 These timelimits
91. See Annex 2, Art. 3.7, Final Act at 354-55, House Document at 1655-56 ("A solution mutually
acceptable to the parties to a dispute and consistent with the covered agreements is clearly to be
preferred:')
92. NAFTA Panel Rules at 71(1) - (2), 59 Fed. Reg. at 8697.
93. Annex 2, Art. 12.7, Final Act at 361, House Document at 1662.
94. Id. at Art. 16.1, Final Act at 363, House Document at 1664. Members may submit objections in
writing at least 10 days prior to the DSB meeting at which the report will be considered. Id. at
Art. 16.2, Final Act at 363, House Document at 1664.
95. Id. at Art. 16.4, Final Act at 363, House Document at 1664.
96. Id. at Art. 17.1, Final Act at 364, House Document at 1665.
97. Id. at Arts. 17.1, 17.2, Final Act at 364, House Document at 1665. Each member may be reappointed once. Id. at Art. 17.2, Final Act at 364, House Document at 1665.
98. Id. at Art. 17.5, Final Act at 364, House Document at 1665.
99. Id. at Art. 17.6, Final Act at 364, House Document at 1665.
100. Id. at Art. 17.13, Final Act at 365, House Document at 1666.
101. Id. at Arts. 17.11, 17.14, Final Act at 365, House Document at 1666.
102. Sixty days for consultations, id. at Art. 4.7, Final Act at 356, House Document at 1657, plus 9
months from the date of establishment of the panel to the date the DSB considers the report, id.
at Art. 20, Final Act at 366, House Document at 1667.
103. Sixty days for consultations, id. at Art. 4.7, Final Act at 356, House Document at 1657, plus 12
months from the date of establishment of the panel to the date the DSB considers the report, id.
at Art. 20, Final Act at 366, House Document at 1667.
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are slightly longer than under the NAFTA, which allows just over 10 months to complete
05
04
panel review, if there is no ECC appeal,1 and 13.5 months if there is an ECC appeal.1
To summarize, NAFTA Chapter 19 and WTO Agreement dispute resolution have
many features in common, including procedures designed to select impartial panelists,
tight deadlines and a process for challenging panel decisions. However, they also differ
significantly in that NAFTA Chapter 19 provides for resolution of AD/CVD disputes following an adjudicative, legal process allowing for full participation by interested parties
and governments and open proceedings whereas the WTO Agreement provides for dispute resolution with an emphasis on settlement by the concerned governments, limited
opportunities for non-government participation and generally closed proceedings.

III. Remedies
In deciding whether to pursue an AD/CVD dispute through the NAFTA or the WTO
Agreement, a key factor to consider is the remedy available in each forum.1 06 The NAFTA
and the WTO Agreement provide different remedies, and a comparison of the two suggests that NAFTA is the more practical route to the remedy most often sought by companies facing the imposition of antidumping or countervailing duties - the removal and
repayment of duties. The WTO Agreement may be the best choice for the resolution of
recurring, global and potentially long-term problems, such as the improper application of
a particular WTO provision that could affect several products subject to AD/CVD proceedings in different WTO member countries.
NAFEA PANEms MAY UPHOLD OR REMAND AGENCY DETERMINATIONS
NAFTA Article 1904 provides: "The panel may uphold a final determination, or
remand it for action not inconsistent with the panel's decision." 10 7 Although it is clear
that a panel can uphold an agency determination, it is not as evident that, in effect, the
authority to remand for action not inconsistent with the panel's decision may be used to
reverse an agency decision.
For example, if a NAFTA panel were to determine that a U.S. International Trade
Commission causation determination was not supported by substantial evidence on the
record, the remand, if properly crafted, could force the ITC to reverse its original determination. 108 Panel decisions are binding on the parties involved. 10 9
A.

104. Three hundred fifteen days from the date of request for panel review to the panel's final determination. NAFTA, Art. 1904.14, 32 I.L.M. at 684.

105. Three hundred fifteen days from the date of request for panel review to the panels' final determination, id., plus 90 days for ECC review, id. at Annex 1904.13(2), 32 I.L.M. at 688.
106. Other key factors include the likelihood of success, which depends on the merits of the case,
and the cost. NAFTA dispute resolution is probably more expensive than WTO Agreement dispute resolution because it is more adjudicative in nature.
107. NAFTA, Art. 1904.8, 32 I.L.M. at 683.

108. See, e.g., Softwood Lumber From Canada, USITC Pub. 2753 at

1, Inv. No. 701-TA-312 (2d
remand) (Mar. 1994) ("In our view, the panel's second decision requires us to conclude that the
information we have collected on the issue of the effects of the price of imports on prices in the
U.S. softwood lumber market does not demonstrate whether subsidized Canadian imports are
having any injurious effects on U.S. lumber prices") (emphasis in original document).
109. NAFTA, Art. 1904.9, 32 I.L.M. at 683.
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WTO DIsPuTE STTLEMENT SEEKS COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT
The remedies available under the WTO Agreement are more amorphous than those
under NAFTA Chapter 19. "Where a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned bring the measure into conformity with that agreement." 10 A panel can only recommend changes to a WTO member's law or practice; the DSB cannot directly enforce
those changes. Moreover, in a case involving an AD or CVD determination, the United
States takes the position that the DSB cannot force the member to remove or refund the
unjustifiable duty.
The remedy for noncompliance with a panel determination is indirect. Where a party
fails to bring its decision into compliance with the WTO Agreement, the members
involved may negotiate compensation for the nullification or impairment of the benefits
accruing to it.111 If these negotiations fail, the injured member may request authorization
12
from the DSB to suspend the application of concessions to the noncomplying member.
This compensation/suspension scheme raises several concerns for the company facing antidumping or countervailing duties. Concerning compensation, the company is
unlikely to benefit from any compensation that might be negotiated since the compensation offered by the offending government is likely to be in a different industry. For example, if the DSB found that AD duties were illegally applied to desks, the offending WTO
member could offer a tariff reduction on steam engines as compensation.
Concerning suspension of concessions, the suspension of concessions may not benefit the company's industry. As a guiding principle, the WTO Agreement recommends that
113
the suspension of concessions apply to the same sector as that involved in the dispute.
4
However, with respect to goods, the term "sector" is defined as "all goods.""1 Therefore, if
the United States won a ruling that a WTO member should not have imposed AD duties
on desks and the WTO member did not provide compensation, the U.S. could raise tariffs
on screwdrivers exported to the U.S. by that WTO member. 115 If compensation or suspension of concessions is pursued, the company still may be subject to the AD or CVD
order from which it seeks relief.
In comparison to NAFTA remedies, the WTO Agreement remedies may appear hollow to a company seeking relief from an AD or CVD order. Because of the direct and precise remedies available, NAFTA dispute settlement is better suited to provide the more
practical and tangible remedy most often sought, the elimination of duties.
B.

110. Annex 2, Art. 19.1, Final Act at 365, House Document at 1666 (footnotes omitted).
111. Id..at Art. 22, Final Act at 367-70, House Document at 1668-71.
112. Id.
113. Id. at Art. 22.3(a), Final Act at 368, House Document at 1669.
114. Id. at Art. 22.3(f), Final Act at 368, House Document at 1669.
115. The "Chicken War" of the early 1960's between the United States and the European Communities is a fitting example of how retaliation strikes different industries. See James Bovard, The
Fair Trade Fraud 231 (1991). In 1963, in retaliation for an EC tariff on imports of American
poultry, the U.S. government imposed duties on trucks, brandies, starches and dextrine imported from the European Communities but not on poultry, which the EC did not export to the U.S.

The U.S. poultry industry, therefore, obtained no direct relief.
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IV Conclusion
Both the NAFTA and the WTO Agreement create improved mechanisms for companies seeking relief from the ever increasing number of AD and CVD cases. NAFTA does
not contain substantive rules governing AD and CVD determinations; rather, it replaces
domestic judicial review. By contrast, the WTO Agreement contains substantive AD and
CVD rules and establishes a process for determining whether a WTO member is in compliance with these rules.
NAFTA and the WTO Agreement have similar selection processes, tight deadlines
and a means for challenging panel decisions. However, NAFTA Chapter 19 provides an
open adjudicative process whereas the WTO Agreement emphasizes a process of conciliation and mediation with limited opportunities for non-government participation.
Concerning remedies, the WTO Agreement calls for a member to come into compliance with the WTO Agreement, and failing that, provides for compensation or suspension of benefits. In contrast, a NAFTA panel decision can result in the revocation of an
AD/CVD order and the refund of duties.

